refactor: 将自定义代码集中到 antigravity/ 目录和 *_antigravity.go 文件
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- antigravity/node-tls-proxy/     ← 原 tools/node-tls-proxy
- antigravity/firewall/           ← 原 tools/firewall
- antigravity/maintenance/        ← 原 tools/maintenance
- repository/http_upstream_antigravity.go  ← Node.js 代理 3 个方法(原在 http_upstream.go)
- service/identity_service_antigravity.go  ← ApplyDefaultFingerprintOverrides + NewIdentityServiceWithSalt
- service/account_antigravity.go  ← Gemini TLS 指纹扩展函数

对上游文件 http_upstream.go 的钩子调用精简为 2 处 if 块(共 14 行)
对上游文件 account.go Gemini 分支精简为 1 行函数调用
便于 upstream rebase 时快速识别和保留自定义改动
This commit is contained in:
win 2026-03-25 11:34:45 +08:00
parent 8b71fa1bf3
commit e5d78f8e56
12 changed files with 1162 additions and 108 deletions

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#!/bin/bash
# sub2api 指纹防泄露 iptables 规则
# 确保只有 Node.js TLS Proxy 能直连上游 HTTPS
# sub2api Go 进程即使有 bug 也无法绕过。
#
# 用法:
# sudo bash setup-firewall.sh [apply|remove|status]
#
# 前置条件:
# - Node.js proxy 以专用用户 "nodeproxy" 运行
# - 创建用户: sudo useradd -r -s /usr/sbin/nologin nodeproxy
set -euo pipefail
NODE_PROXY_USER="${MG_NODE_PROXY_USER:-nodeproxy}"
CHAIN_NAME="MG_FINGERPRINT"
log() { echo "[$(date '+%H:%M:%S')] $*"; }
apply_rules() {
log "Applying fingerprint firewall rules..."
# 验证用户存在
if ! id "$NODE_PROXY_USER" &>/dev/null; then
log "ERROR: User '$NODE_PROXY_USER' does not exist."
log "Create it: sudo useradd -r -s /usr/sbin/nologin $NODE_PROXY_USER"
exit 1
fi
# 创建自定义链(幂等)
iptables -N "$CHAIN_NAME" 2>/dev/null || iptables -F "$CHAIN_NAME"
# === Rule 1: QUIC 阻断 — 丢弃所有出站 UDP 443/4433 ===
iptables -A "$CHAIN_NAME" -p udp --dport 443 -j DROP \
-m comment --comment "MG: block QUIC/HTTP3 UDP 443"
iptables -A "$CHAIN_NAME" -p udp --dport 4433 -j DROP \
-m comment --comment "MG: block QUIC alt UDP 4433"
# === Rule 2: 允许 Node.js proxy 出站 TCP 443 ===
iptables -A "$CHAIN_NAME" -p tcp --dport 443 \
-m owner --uid-owner "$NODE_PROXY_USER" -j ACCEPT \
-m comment --comment "MG: allow nodeproxy TCP 443"
# === Rule 3: 阻止其他进程直连 TCP 443 ===
iptables -A "$CHAIN_NAME" -p tcp --dport 443 -j REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset \
-m comment --comment "MG: block non-proxy TCP 443"
# 将自定义链挂载到 OUTPUT幂等
if ! iptables -C OUTPUT -j "$CHAIN_NAME" 2>/dev/null; then
iptables -A OUTPUT -j "$CHAIN_NAME"
fi
# === Rule 4: IPv6 全面阻断 ===
ip6tables -N "${CHAIN_NAME}_V6" 2>/dev/null || ip6tables -F "${CHAIN_NAME}_V6"
# 允许回环
ip6tables -A "${CHAIN_NAME}_V6" -o lo -j ACCEPT \
-m comment --comment "MG: allow IPv6 loopback"
# 阻断其他 IPv6 出站
ip6tables -A "${CHAIN_NAME}_V6" -j DROP \
-m comment --comment "MG: block all IPv6 outbound"
if ! ip6tables -C OUTPUT -j "${CHAIN_NAME}_V6" 2>/dev/null; then
ip6tables -A OUTPUT -j "${CHAIN_NAME}_V6"
fi
log "Firewall rules applied successfully."
log " - UDP 443/4433: BLOCKED (QUIC)"
log " - TCP 443: ONLY '$NODE_PROXY_USER' allowed"
log " - IPv6 outbound: BLOCKED"
}
remove_rules() {
log "Removing fingerprint firewall rules..."
# 从 OUTPUT 移除引用
iptables -D OUTPUT -j "$CHAIN_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
ip6tables -D OUTPUT -j "${CHAIN_NAME}_V6" 2>/dev/null || true
# 清空并删除自定义链
iptables -F "$CHAIN_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
iptables -X "$CHAIN_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
ip6tables -F "${CHAIN_NAME}_V6" 2>/dev/null || true
ip6tables -X "${CHAIN_NAME}_V6" 2>/dev/null || true
log "Firewall rules removed."
}
show_status() {
log "=== IPv4 MG_FINGERPRINT chain ==="
iptables -L "$CHAIN_NAME" -n -v 2>/dev/null || echo "(not found)"
echo
log "=== IPv6 MG_FINGERPRINT_V6 chain ==="
ip6tables -L "${CHAIN_NAME}_V6" -n -v 2>/dev/null || echo "(not found)"
}
case "${1:-apply}" in
apply) apply_rules ;;
remove) remove_rules ;;
status) show_status ;;
*)
echo "Usage: $0 [apply|remove|status]"
exit 1
;;
esac

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# save-patches.sh — 将 Antigravity 自定义改动导出为 patch 文件
# 用法: ./tools/scripts/save-patches.sh [输出目录]
set -euo pipefail
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." && pwd)"
OUTPUT_DIR="${1:-$REPO_ROOT/tools/patches}"
UPSTREAM="origin/main"
cd "$REPO_ROOT"
# 检查是否有新的 upstream commits
DIVERGED=$(git log --oneline "$UPSTREAM"..HEAD 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
if [ "$DIVERGED" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "[save-patches] 没有领先 upstream 的 commits无需保存。"
exit 0
fi
mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR"
# 导出 patches
git format-patch "$UPSTREAM"..HEAD --output-directory "$OUTPUT_DIR" --no-stat
COUNT=$(ls "$OUTPUT_DIR"/*.patch 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
echo "[save-patches] ✅ 已导出 $COUNT 个 patch 到 $OUTPUT_DIR/"
echo ""
echo "恢复方法(在全新 upstream checkout 上):"
echo " git am $OUTPUT_DIR/*.patch"
echo " # 或逐一应用:"
echo " for p in $OUTPUT_DIR/*.patch; do git am \"\$p\" || git am --skip; done"

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# sync-upstream.sh — 从 upstream (origin/main) 同步更新,保留自定义改动
# 用法: ./tools/scripts/sync-upstream.sh
set -euo pipefail
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." && pwd)"
UPSTREAM="origin/main"
cd "$REPO_ROOT"
echo "========================================"
echo " Antigravity Fork — Upstream Sync Tool"
echo "========================================"
echo ""
# Step 1: 检查工作区
if ! git diff --quiet || ! git diff --staged --quiet; then
echo "❌ 工作区有未提交的改动,请先 git stash 或 git commit"
git status --short
exit 1
fi
# Step 2: Fetch
echo "[1/4] Fetching upstream..."
git fetch origin
# Step 3: 检查是否有新 commits
NEW=$(git log --oneline HEAD.."$UPSTREAM" 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
if [ "$NEW" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "✅ 已是最新,无需同步。"
exit 0
fi
echo ""
echo "上游有 $NEW 个新 commits:"
git log --oneline HEAD.."$UPSTREAM"
echo ""
# Step 4: 备份当前 patches
PATCH_DIR="/tmp/antigravity-patches-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"
echo "[2/4] 备份自定义 patches 到 $PATCH_DIR ..."
mkdir -p "$PATCH_DIR"
git format-patch "$UPSTREAM"..HEAD -o "$PATCH_DIR/" --no-stat
BACKED=$(ls "$PATCH_DIR"/*.patch 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
echo " 已备份 $BACKED 个 patch"
# Step 5: Rebase
echo ""
echo "[3/4] 执行 rebase (git rebase $UPSTREAM)..."
echo " 如果出现冲突,请参考 .agents/workflows/sync-upstream.md 中的冲突解决指南"
echo ""
if ! git rebase "$UPSTREAM"; then
echo ""
echo "❌ Rebase 出现冲突!"
echo ""
echo "请按以下步骤处理:"
echo " 1. 查看冲突文件: git diff --name-only --diff-filter=U"
echo " 2. 解决冲突(参考 .agents/workflows/sync-upstream.md"
echo " 3. git add <解决的文件>"
echo " 4. git rebase --continue"
echo ""
echo "备份的 patches 在: $PATCH_DIR"
exit 1
fi
# Step 6: 编译验证
echo "[4/4] 编译验证..."
if ! (cd "$REPO_ROOT/backend" && go build ./... 2>&1); then
echo ""
echo "❌ 编译失败rebase 后有破坏性改动需要修复。"
echo "备份的 patches 在: $PATCH_DIR"
exit 1
fi
echo ""
echo "✅ 同步完成!"
echo ""
echo "自定义改动(我方 commits已成功移植到最新 upstream 上。"
echo "请运行以下命令推送:"
echo " git push origin main --force-with-lease"
echo ""
echo "备份路径(可删除): $PATCH_DIR"

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FROM node:24.13.0-slim
LABEL maintainer="Wei-Shaw <github.com/Wei-Shaw>"
LABEL description="Node.js TLS Forward Proxy - native JA3/JA4 fingerprint matching"
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/Wei-Shaw/sub2api"
WORKDIR /app
COPY proxy.js package.json ./
# 零依赖,不需要 npm install
ENV PROXY_PORT=3456
ENV PROXY_HOST=0.0.0.0
ENV UPSTREAM_HOST=api.anthropic.com
EXPOSE 3456
# 健康检查:用 Node.js 内置 http 模块,不依赖 curl
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --retries=3 --start-period=5s \
CMD node -e "const http=require('http');const r=http.get('http://127.0.0.1:'+(process.env.PROXY_PORT||3456)+'/__health',s=>{process.exit(s.statusCode===200?0:1)});r.on('error',()=>process.exit(1));r.setTimeout(3000,()=>{r.destroy();process.exit(1)})"
USER node
CMD ["node", "proxy.js"]

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{
"name": "node-tls-proxy",
"version": "1.0.0",
"private": true,
"description": "Node.js TLS forward proxy for native JA3/JA4 fingerprint matching",
"main": "proxy.js",
"scripts": {
"start": "node proxy.js",
"health": "curl -s http://127.0.0.1:${PROXY_PORT:-3456}/__health | jq ."
},
"engines": {
"node": ">=20.0.0"
}
}

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'use strict';
const http = require('http');
const https = require('https');
const http2 = require('http2');
const net = require('net');
const crypto = require('crypto');
// os 模块不引用 — 避免暴露真实主机信息
// ─── 配置 ───────────────────────────────────────────────
const UPSTREAM_HOST = process.env.UPSTREAM_HOST || 'api.anthropic.com';
const LISTEN_PORT = parseInt(process.env.PROXY_PORT || '3456', 10);
const LISTEN_HOST = process.env.PROXY_HOST || '127.0.0.1';
const UPSTREAM_PROXY = process.env.UPSTREAM_PROXY || '';
const CONNECT_TIMEOUT = parseInt(process.env.CONNECT_TIMEOUT || '30000', 10);
const IDLE_TIMEOUT = parseInt(process.env.IDLE_TIMEOUT || '600000', 10);
const TELEMETRY_ENABLED = process.env.TELEMETRY_ENABLED !== 'false'; // 默认开启
const DD_API_KEY = process.env.DD_API_KEY || 'pubbbf48e6d78dae54bceaa4acf463299bf';
const CLI_VERSION = process.env.CLI_VERSION || '2.1.81';
const BUILD_TIME = process.env.BUILD_TIME || '2026-03-20T21:26:18Z';
// 伪装的 Node 版本CLI 2.1.81 打包的 Node 版本)
const FAKE_NODE_VERSION = process.env.FAKE_NODE_VERSION || 'v22.14.0';
const log = (level, msg, extra = {}) => {
const entry = { time: new Date().toISOString(), level, msg, ...extra };
process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(entry) + '\n');
};
const HEALTH_PATH = '/__health';
const h2Hosts = new Set();
const h2Sessions = new Map();
// ─── 虚拟主机身份生成 ─────────────────────────────────────
// 每个账号基于 seed 生成全局唯一的主机身份,看起来像一台真实的个人开发机
// 匹配 CLI 的 OTEL detectResources: hostDetector + processDetector + serviceInstanceIdDetector
//
// 设计原则:
// 1. 同一账号seed永远产出同一台"机器"的特征
// 2. 不同账号的特征互不相同(无共享池、无碰撞)
// 3. 每个字段都像人手动设置的,不是程序生成的
// hostname 构造词表 — 组合后空间 > 100万基本不碰撞
const HN_PREFIX = ['dev','code','work','build','my','home','lab','eng','hack','prog','desk','box','main','personal','linux'];
const HN_MIDDLE = ['','station','machine','server','node','pc','setup','rig','env','hub'];
const HN_STYLE = ['dash','dot','bare']; // 连接风格
// 用户名词表 — 真实开发者常用,组合后也是高基数
const UN_FIRST = ['alex','sam','chris','jordan','max','lee','kai','pat','jamie','taylor','morgan','casey','drew','avery','riley','blake','quinn','reese','cameron','skyler','dev','coder','user','admin','ubuntu','runner'];
const UN_SUFFIX = ['','dev','eng','42','_dev','01','x','z','_','99','007'];
function generateHostIdentity(seed) {
// 确定性哈希工具:同一 seed+suffix 永远返回同一结果
const h = (suffix) => crypto.createHash('sha256').update(seed + ':' + suffix).digest();
// ── hostname: 组合生成,如 "alex-devstation", "work-box-7f3a" ──
const hb = h('hostname');
const prefix = HN_PREFIX[hb.readUInt8(0) % HN_PREFIX.length];
const middle = HN_MIDDLE[hb.readUInt8(1) % HN_MIDDLE.length];
const style = HN_STYLE[hb.readUInt8(2) % HN_STYLE.length];
const tail = hb.slice(3, 5).toString('hex'); // 4 hex chars 保证唯一
let hostname;
if (middle) {
const sep = style === 'dot' ? '.' : style === 'dash' ? '-' : '';
hostname = `${prefix}${sep}${middle}`;
} else {
// 无中间词时必须加 hex 尾缀,避免 hostname 太短(如裸 "my"、"dev"
hostname = `${prefix}-${tail}`;
}
// 有中间词时 50% 概率加 hex 尾缀(真实场景很多人用 hostname 如 "dev-box-a3f2"
if (middle && hb.readUInt8(5) % 2 === 0) hostname += `-${tail}`;
// ── username: 组合生成,如 "alexdev", "sam42", "chris_dev" ──
const ub = h('username');
const first = UN_FIRST[ub.readUInt8(0) % UN_FIRST.length];
const suffix = UN_SUFFIX[ub.readUInt8(1) % UN_SUFFIX.length];
const username = `${first}${suffix}`;
// ── terminal & shell: 按权重分布xterm-256color 占大多数) ──
const termRoll = h('terminal').readUInt8(0) % 100;
const terminal = termRoll < 60 ? 'xterm-256color' :
termRoll < 75 ? 'screen-256color' :
termRoll < 88 ? 'tmux-256color' :
termRoll < 95 ? 'alacritty' : 'rxvt-unicode-256color';
const shellRoll = h('shell').readUInt8(0) % 100;
const shell = shellRoll < 55 ? '/bin/bash' :
shellRoll < 85 ? '/bin/zsh' :
shellRoll < 95 ? '/usr/bin/bash' : '/usr/bin/zsh';
// ── host.id: /etc/machine-id (32 hex chars, Linux 标准) ──
const machineId = h('machine-id').slice(0, 16).toString('hex');
// ── PID: 每个 session 随机生成,模拟每次启动新进程 ──
// 不用 seed 确定性生成,因为真实 CLI 每次启动都是新 PID
const pid = 1000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 64000);
// ── kernel version: 模拟真实 Linux 发行版 ──
const kb = h('kernel');
const kernelMajor = 5 + (kb.readUInt8(0) % 2); // 5 or 6
const kernelMinor = kb.readUInt8(1) % 20;
const kernelPatch = kb.readUInt8(2) % 200;
const ubuntuBuild = 50 + (kb.readUInt8(3) % 150);
const osVersion = `#${ubuntuBuild}-Ubuntu SMP`;
// ── 可执行文件路径: 按安装方式分布 ──
const pathRoll = h('execpath').readUInt8(0) % 100;
const executablePath = pathRoll < 40 ? `/home/${username}/.claude/local/claude` :
pathRoll < 70 ? '/usr/local/bin/claude' :
pathRoll < 90 ? `/home/${username}/.local/bin/claude` :
'/usr/bin/claude';
return {
hostname,
username,
terminal,
shell,
machineId,
pid,
arch: 'x64',
osType: 'Linux',
osVersion,
kernelRelease: `${kernelMajor}.${kernelMinor}.${kernelPatch}-generic`,
// service.instance.id: 每个 session 唯一CLI 用 randomUUID
serviceInstanceId: crypto.randomUUID(),
executablePath,
executableName: 'claude',
command: 'claude',
commandArgs: [],
runtimeName: 'nodejs',
runtimeVersion: FAKE_NODE_VERSION.replace('v', ''),
// ripgrep 信息也按 seed 生成,不同账号不一样
ripgrepVersion: (() => {
const rv = h('ripgrep');
const versions = ['14.1.1','14.1.0','14.0.2','13.0.0','13.0.1','14.0.1','14.0.0'];
return versions[rv.readUInt8(0) % versions.length];
})(),
ripgrepPath: (() => {
const rp = h('rgpath');
const paths = ['/usr/bin/rg','/usr/local/bin/rg','/home/'+username+'/.cargo/bin/rg','/snap/bin/rg','/usr/bin/rg','/usr/bin/rg'];
return paths[rp.readUInt8(0) % paths.length];
})(),
// MCP server 数量(真实用户 0~6 个,影响启动事件序列)
mcpServerCount: 1 + (h('mcp').readUInt8(0) % 5), // 1~5
mcpFailCount: h('mcp').readUInt8(1) % 3, // 0~2 个失败
};
}
// ─── 遥测模拟 ────────────────────────────────────────────
// 每个 device_id 的会话状态
const sessionStates = new Map();
function getOrCreateSession(deviceId) {
if (sessionStates.has(deviceId)) return sessionStates.get(deviceId);
const hostId = generateHostIdentity(deviceId);
const state = {
sessionId: crypto.randomUUID(),
deviceId,
hostId,
startTime: Date.now(),
requestCount: 0,
// 追踪 ripgrep 是否已上报
ripgrepReported: false,
};
sessionStates.set(deviceId, state);
return state;
}
function generateDeviceId(accountSeed) {
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(`device:${accountSeed}`).digest('hex');
}
// ─── OTEL Resource Attributes (匹配 CLI 的 detectResources) ───
function buildEnvBlock(hostId) {
return {
platform: 'linux',
node_version: FAKE_NODE_VERSION,
terminal: hostId.terminal,
package_managers: 'npm',
runtimes: 'node',
is_running_with_bun: false,
is_ci: false,
is_claubbit: false,
is_github_action: false,
is_claude_code_action: false,
is_claude_ai_auth: false,
version: CLI_VERSION,
arch: hostId.arch,
is_claude_code_remote: false,
deployment_environment: 'unknown-linux',
is_conductor: false,
version_base: CLI_VERSION,
build_time: BUILD_TIME,
is_local_agent_mode: false,
vcs: 'git',
platform_raw: 'linux',
};
}
function buildProcessMetrics(uptime) {
// 模拟真实 CLI 的内存曲线RSS 随 uptime 缓慢增长
const baseRss = 180_000_000 + Math.min(uptime * 50_000, 200_000_000);
const rss = Math.floor(baseRss + Math.random() * 80_000_000);
const heapTotal = Math.floor(rss * 0.6 + Math.random() * 10_000_000);
const heapUsed = Math.floor(heapTotal * 0.5 + Math.random() * heapTotal * 0.3);
return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({
uptime,
rss,
heapTotal,
heapUsed,
external: 14_000_000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 2_000_000),
arrayBuffers: Math.floor(Math.random() * 10_000),
constrainedMemory: 0,
cpuUsage: {
user: Math.floor(uptime * 10_000 + Math.random() * 300_000),
system: Math.floor(uptime * 2_000 + Math.random() * 80_000),
},
cpuPercent: Math.random() * 200,
})).toString('base64');
}
function buildEvent(eventName, session, model, betas, extraData, timestampOverride) {
const uptime = (Date.now() - session.startTime) / 1000;
const processMetrics = buildProcessMetrics(uptime);
// 缓存最近一次的 process metrics供 DataDog 日志复用(保持两边一致)
session._lastProcessMetrics = { uptime, raw: processMetrics };
const eventData = {
event_name: eventName,
client_timestamp: timestampOverride || new Date().toISOString(),
model: model || 'claude-sonnet-4-6',
session_id: session.sessionId,
user_type: 'external',
betas: betas || 'claude-code-20250219,interleaved-thinking-2025-05-14',
env: buildEnvBlock(session.hostId),
entrypoint: 'cli',
is_interactive: true,
client_type: 'cli',
process: processMetrics,
event_id: crypto.randomUUID(),
device_id: session.deviceId,
// 注意:不加 resource 字段 — event_logging/batch 是自定义端点,
// OTEL resource attributes 由 CLI 通过单独的 OTLP exporter 发送,不在这里
};
// 合并额外字段(用于特定事件的附加数据)
if (extraData) Object.assign(eventData, extraData);
return {
event_type: 'ClaudeCodeInternalEvent',
event_data: eventData,
};
}
// 发送遥测到 api.anthropic.com/api/event_logging/batch
function sendTelemetryEvents(events, session) {
if (!TELEMETRY_ENABLED || events.length === 0) return;
const body = JSON.stringify({ events });
const headers = {
'Accept': 'application/json, text/plain, */*',
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'User-Agent': `claude-code/${CLI_VERSION}`,
'x-service-name': 'claude-code',
'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(body),
};
// 如果有 session注入 OTEL trace headers匹配 CLI 的 W3C Trace Context
if (session) {
const traceId = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
const spanId = crypto.randomBytes(8).toString('hex');
headers['traceparent'] = `00-${traceId}-${spanId}-01`;
}
const opts = {
hostname: 'api.anthropic.com',
port: 443,
path: '/api/event_logging/batch',
method: 'POST',
headers,
timeout: 10000,
};
const req = https.request(opts, (res) => {
res.resume(); // drain
log('debug', 'telemetry_sent', { status: res.statusCode, events: events.length });
});
req.on('error', (err) => {
log('debug', 'telemetry_error', { error: err.message });
});
req.on('timeout', () => req.destroy());
req.end(body);
}
// 发送 DataDog 日志
function sendDatadogLog(eventName, session, model) {
if (!TELEMETRY_ENABLED) return;
const hostId = session.hostId;
const uptime = (Date.now() - session.startTime) / 1000;
// 复用 Anthropic 事件侧缓存的 process metrics保持两边数值一致
// 如果没有缓存(首次调用),现场生成
let pm;
if (session._lastProcessMetrics && Math.abs(session._lastProcessMetrics.uptime - uptime) < 2) {
pm = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(session._lastProcessMetrics.raw, 'base64').toString());
} else {
const baseRss = 180_000_000 + Math.min(uptime * 50_000, 200_000_000);
const rss = Math.floor(baseRss + Math.random() * 80_000_000);
const heapTotal = Math.floor(rss * 0.6 + Math.random() * 10_000_000);
const heapUsed = Math.floor(heapTotal * 0.5 + Math.random() * heapTotal * 0.3);
pm = {
uptime,
rss,
heapTotal,
heapUsed,
external: 14_000_000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 2_000_000),
arrayBuffers: Math.floor(Math.random() * 10_000),
constrainedMemory: 0,
cpuUsage: {
user: Math.floor(uptime * 10_000 + Math.random() * 300_000),
system: Math.floor(uptime * 2_000 + Math.random() * 80_000),
},
};
}
const entry = {
ddsource: 'nodejs',
ddtags: `event:${eventName},arch:${hostId.arch},client_type:cli,model:${model || 'claude-sonnet-4-6'},platform:linux,user_type:external,version:${CLI_VERSION},version_base:${CLI_VERSION}`,
message: eventName,
service: 'claude-code',
hostname: hostId.hostname,
env: 'external',
model: model || 'claude-sonnet-4-6',
session_id: session.sessionId,
user_type: 'external',
entrypoint: 'cli',
is_interactive: 'true',
client_type: 'cli',
process_metrics: pm,
platform: 'linux',
platform_raw: 'linux',
arch: hostId.arch,
node_version: FAKE_NODE_VERSION,
version: CLI_VERSION,
version_base: CLI_VERSION,
build_time: BUILD_TIME,
deployment_environment: 'unknown-linux',
vcs: 'git',
};
const body = JSON.stringify([entry]);
const opts = {
hostname: 'http-intake.logs.us5.datadoghq.com',
port: 443,
path: '/api/v2/logs',
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Accept': 'application/json, text/plain, */*',
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'User-Agent': 'axios/1.13.6',
'dd-api-key': DD_API_KEY,
'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(body),
},
timeout: 10000,
};
const req = https.request(opts, (res) => { res.resume(); });
req.on('error', () => {});
req.on('timeout', () => req.destroy());
req.end(body);
}
// 请求前发遥测(模拟 CLI 启动 + 初始化事件)
function emitPreRequestTelemetry(reqHeaders, body) {
const accountSeed = reqHeaders['x-forwarded-host'] || 'default';
const deviceId = generateDeviceId(accountSeed + ':' + (reqHeaders['authorization'] || '').slice(-16));
const session = getOrCreateSession(deviceId);
session.requestCount++;
// 从请求体解析真实 model
let model = 'claude-sonnet-4-6';
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(body.toString());
if (parsed.model) model = parsed.model;
} catch (_) {}
const betas = reqHeaders['anthropic-beta'] || 'claude-code-20250219,context-1m-2025-08-07,interleaved-thinking-2025-05-14,redact-thinking-2026-02-12,context-management-2025-06-27,prompt-caching-scope-2026-01-05,effort-2025-11-24';
// 首次请求:发完整启动事件序列(匹配真实 CLI 的时序)
if (session.requestCount === 1) {
const hostId = session.hostId;
// 生成递增的时间戳,模拟真实 CLI 启动流程的时间差
const baseTime = Date.now();
const ts = (offsetMs) => new Date(baseTime + offsetMs).toISOString();
// 第一批:启动 + 工具检测 + MCP 连接事件
const batch1 = [
buildEvent('tengu_started', session, model, betas, null, ts(0)),
buildEvent('tengu_init', session, model, betas, null, ts(80 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 120))),
// tengu_ripgrep_availability — CLI 必发的工具检测事件,版本/路径按账号不同
buildEvent('tengu_ripgrep_availability', session, model, betas, {
ripgrep_available: true,
ripgrep_version: hostId.ripgrepVersion,
ripgrep_path: hostId.ripgrepPath,
}, ts(200 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 150))),
];
// MCP 连接事件:数量按账号不同(真实用户配置的 MCP server 数量差异很大)
let mcpOffset = 400;
const mcpSuccessCount = hostId.mcpServerCount - hostId.mcpFailCount;
for (let i = 0; i < hostId.mcpFailCount; i++) {
mcpOffset += 100 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 300);
batch1.push(buildEvent('tengu_mcp_server_connection_failed', session, model, betas, null, ts(mcpOffset)));
}
for (let i = 0; i < mcpSuccessCount; i++) {
mcpOffset += 200 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 500);
batch1.push(buildEvent('tengu_mcp_server_connection_succeeded', session, model, betas, null, ts(mcpOffset)));
}
session.ripgrepReported = true;
sendTelemetryEvents(batch1, session);
sendDatadogLog('tengu_started', session, model);
sendDatadogLog('tengu_init', session, model);
// 第二批延迟发送(真实 CLI 间隔约 30 秒)
setTimeout(() => {
const batch2 = [
buildEvent('tengu_session_init', session, model, betas),
buildEvent('tengu_context_loaded', session, model, betas),
];
sendTelemetryEvents(batch2, session);
}, 25000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 10000));
}
// 每次请求:发 request_started
const events = [
buildEvent('tengu_api_request_started', session, model, betas),
];
sendTelemetryEvents(events, session);
}
// 请求后发遥测
function emitPostRequestTelemetry(reqHeaders, statusCode, body) {
const accountSeed = reqHeaders['x-forwarded-host'] || 'default';
const deviceId = generateDeviceId(accountSeed + ':' + (reqHeaders['authorization'] || '').slice(-16));
const session = getOrCreateSession(deviceId);
let model = 'claude-sonnet-4-6';
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(body.toString());
if (parsed.model) model = parsed.model;
} catch (_) {}
const betas = reqHeaders['anthropic-beta'] || 'claude-code-20250219,context-1m-2025-08-07,interleaved-thinking-2025-05-14,redact-thinking-2026-02-12,context-management-2025-06-27,prompt-caching-scope-2026-01-05,effort-2025-11-24';
// 请求完成事件
const events = [
buildEvent('tengu_api_request_completed', session, model, betas),
buildEvent('tengu_conversation_turn_completed', session, model, betas),
];
sendTelemetryEvents(events, session);
sendDatadogLog('tengu_api_request_completed', session, model);
// 模拟错误遥测(低概率,匹配 TelemetrySafeError
if (statusCode >= 400 && Math.random() < 0.5) {
const errorEvent = buildEvent('tengu_api_request_error', session, model, betas, {
error_type: 'TelemetrySafeError',
error_code: statusCode,
error_message: statusCode === 429 ? 'rate_limit_exceeded' :
statusCode === 529 ? 'overloaded' :
statusCode >= 500 ? 'server_error' : 'client_error',
});
sendTelemetryEvents([errorEvent], session);
}
// 随机发额外事件(仅使用已知的真实 CLI 事件名)
if (Math.random() < 0.3) {
setTimeout(() => {
const extra = [
buildEvent('tengu_tool_use_completed', session, model, betas),
];
sendTelemetryEvents(extra, session);
}, 2000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 5000));
}
}
// ─── H2 session 管理 ────────────────────────────────────
function getOrCreateH2Session(host) {
const existing = h2Sessions.get(host);
if (existing && !existing.closed && !existing.destroyed) return existing;
if (existing) { try { existing.close(); } catch (_) {} }
const session = http2.connect(`https://${host}`);
session.on('error', (err) => {
log('warn', 'h2_session_error', { host, error: err.message });
h2Sessions.delete(host);
try { session.close(); } catch (_) {}
});
session.on('close', () => h2Sessions.delete(host));
session.on('goaway', () => { h2Sessions.delete(host); try { session.close(); } catch (_) {} });
session.setTimeout(IDLE_TIMEOUT, () => { session.close(); h2Sessions.delete(host); });
h2Sessions.set(host, session);
return session;
}
function waitForConnect(session) {
if (session.connected) return Promise.resolve();
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
session.once('connect', resolve);
session.once('error', reject);
const t = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('h2 connect timeout')), CONNECT_TIMEOUT);
session.once('connect', () => clearTimeout(t));
});
}
// ─── CONNECT 隧道 ────────────────────────────────────────
function connectViaProxy(proxyUrl, targetHost, targetPort) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const proxy = new URL(proxyUrl);
const conn = net.connect(parseInt(proxy.port || '80', 10), proxy.hostname, () => {
const auth = proxy.username
? `Proxy-Authorization: Basic ${Buffer.from(`${decodeURIComponent(proxy.username)}:${decodeURIComponent(proxy.password || '')}`).toString('base64')}\r\n`
: '';
conn.write(`CONNECT ${targetHost}:${targetPort} HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: ${targetHost}:${targetPort}\r\n${auth}\r\n`);
});
conn.once('error', reject);
conn.setTimeout(CONNECT_TIMEOUT, () => conn.destroy(new Error('CONNECT timeout')));
let buf = '';
conn.on('data', function onData(chunk) {
buf += chunk.toString();
const idx = buf.indexOf('\r\n\r\n');
if (idx === -1) return;
conn.removeListener('data', onData);
const code = parseInt(buf.split(' ')[1], 10);
if (code === 200) { conn.setTimeout(0); resolve(conn); }
else { conn.destroy(); reject(new Error(`CONNECT ${code}`)); }
});
});
}
// ─── 收集请求体 ──────────────────────────────────────────
function collectBody(req) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const chunks = [];
req.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c));
req.on('end', () => resolve(Buffer.concat(chunks)));
req.on('error', () => resolve(Buffer.concat(chunks)));
});
}
// ─── H1 代理 ─────────────────────────────────────────────
function sendViaH1(targetHost, method, path, reqHeaders, body, res, savedHeaders) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const headers = { ...reqHeaders, host: targetHost };
['x-forwarded-host', 'connection', 'keep-alive', 'proxy-connection', 'transfer-encoding'].forEach(h => delete headers[h]);
if (body.length > 0) headers['content-length'] = String(body.length);
const opts = { hostname: targetHost, port: 443, path, method, headers, servername: targetHost, timeout: CONNECT_TIMEOUT };
const startTime = Date.now();
const finish = (requestOpts) => {
const proxyReq = https.request(requestOpts);
proxyReq.on('response', (proxyRes) => {
log('info', 'proxy_response', { host: targetHost, status: proxyRes.statusCode, path, proto: 'h1' });
const rh = { ...proxyRes.headers };
delete rh['connection']; delete rh['keep-alive'];
res.writeHead(proxyRes.statusCode, rh);
proxyRes.pipe(res, { end: true });
// 请求完成后发遥测
if (path.includes('/v1/messages') && savedHeaders) {
emitPostRequestTelemetry(savedHeaders, proxyRes.statusCode, body);
}
resolve('ok');
});
proxyReq.on('error', (err) => {
if (err.message === 'socket hang up' && (Date.now() - startTime) < 2000) {
log('info', 'h1_rejected_switching_to_h2', { host: targetHost });
h2Hosts.add(targetHost);
sendViaH2(targetHost, method, path, reqHeaders, body, res, savedHeaders).then(() => resolve('h2'));
return;
}
log('error', 'h1_error', { error: err.message, host: targetHost, path });
if (!res.headersSent) { res.writeHead(502); res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: err.message })); }
resolve('error');
});
proxyReq.on('timeout', () => proxyReq.destroy(new Error('timeout')));
proxyReq.end(body);
};
if (UPSTREAM_PROXY) {
connectViaProxy(UPSTREAM_PROXY, targetHost, 443)
.then((socket) => { opts.socket = socket; opts.agent = false; finish(opts); })
.catch((err) => { log('error', 'tunnel_failed', { error: err.message }); if (!res.headersSent) { res.writeHead(502); res.end('tunnel error'); } resolve('error'); });
} else {
finish(opts);
}
});
}
// ─── H2 代理 ─────────────────────────────────────────────
async function sendViaH2(targetHost, method, path, reqHeaders, body, res, savedHeaders) {
try {
const session = getOrCreateH2Session(targetHost);
await waitForConnect(session);
const headers = {};
const skip = new Set(['host','connection','keep-alive','proxy-connection','transfer-encoding','upgrade','x-forwarded-host','http2-settings']);
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(reqHeaders)) {
if (!skip.has(k.toLowerCase())) headers[k] = v;
}
headers[':method'] = method;
headers[':path'] = path;
headers[':authority'] = targetHost;
headers[':scheme'] = 'https';
if (body.length > 0) headers['content-length'] = String(body.length);
const stream = session.request(headers);
let responded = false;
stream.on('response', (h2h) => {
responded = true;
const status = h2h[':status'] || 502;
const rh = {};
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(h2h)) { if (!k.startsWith(':')) rh[k] = v; }
log('info', 'proxy_response', { host: targetHost, status, path, proto: 'h2' });
res.writeHead(status, rh);
stream.on('data', (c) => res.write(c));
stream.on('end', () => res.end());
if (path.includes('/v1/messages') && savedHeaders) {
emitPostRequestTelemetry(savedHeaders, status);
}
});
stream.on('error', (err) => {
if (err.message && err.message.includes('NGHTTP2')) {
h2Sessions.delete(targetHost);
try { session.close(); } catch (_) {}
}
if (responded) { if (!res.writableEnded) res.end(); return; }
log('error', 'h2_error', { error: err.message, host: targetHost, path });
if (!res.headersSent) { res.writeHead(502); res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: err.message })); }
});
stream.on('close', () => {
if (!responded && !res.headersSent) {
log('warn', 'h2_no_response', { host: targetHost, path });
res.writeHead(502); res.end('{"error":"h2_no_response"}');
} else if (!res.writableEnded) { res.end(); }
});
stream.setTimeout(CONNECT_TIMEOUT, () => stream.close());
stream.end(body);
} catch (err) {
log('error', 'h2_exception', { error: err.message, host: targetHost });
h2Sessions.delete(targetHost);
if (!res.headersSent) { res.writeHead(502); res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: err.message })); }
}
}
// ─── 请求入口 ─────────────────────────────────────────────
async function proxyRequest(req, res) {
const targetHost = req.headers['x-forwarded-host'] || UPSTREAM_HOST;
log('info', 'proxy_request', { host: targetHost, method: req.method, path: req.url });
// 保存原始 headers 用于遥测
const savedHeaders = { ...req.headers };
const body = await collectBody(req);
// 请求前发遥测(仅 /v1/messages 请求)
if (req.url.includes('/v1/messages') && TELEMETRY_ENABLED) {
emitPreRequestTelemetry(savedHeaders, body);
// 随机延迟 50-200ms 模拟真实 CLI 行为
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 50 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 150)));
}
if (h2Hosts.has(targetHost)) {
await sendViaH2(targetHost, req.method, req.url, req.headers, body, res, savedHeaders);
} else {
await sendViaH1(targetHost, req.method, req.url, req.headers, body, res, savedHeaders);
}
}
// ─── HTTP 服务器 ─────────────────────────────────────────
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
if (req.url === HEALTH_PATH) {
res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({
status: 'ok', node: process.version, openssl: process.versions.openssl,
uptime: process.uptime(), h2Hosts: [...h2Hosts],
telemetry: TELEMETRY_ENABLED, sessions: sessionStates.size,
}));
return;
}
proxyRequest(req, res).catch((err) => {
log('error', 'unhandled', { error: err.message });
if (!res.headersSent) { res.writeHead(500); res.end('internal error'); }
});
});
server.timeout = 0;
server.keepAliveTimeout = IDLE_TIMEOUT;
server.headersTimeout = 60000;
server.listen(LISTEN_PORT, LISTEN_HOST, () => {
log('info', 'node-tls-proxy started', {
listen: `${LISTEN_HOST}:${LISTEN_PORT}`, node: process.version, openssl: process.versions.openssl,
telemetry: TELEMETRY_ENABLED,
});
});
// 定期清理过期 session1 小时无活动)
setInterval(() => {
const now = Date.now();
for (const [id, state] of sessionStates) {
if (now - state.startTime > 3600_000) sessionStates.delete(id);
}
}, 300_000);
let stopping = false;
function shutdown(sig) {
if (stopping) return; stopping = true;
for (const s of h2Sessions.values()) try { s.close(); } catch (_) {}
h2Sessions.clear();
server.close(() => process.exit(0));
setTimeout(() => process.exit(1), 5000);
}
process.on('SIGTERM', () => shutdown('SIGTERM'));
process.on('SIGINT', () => shutdown('SIGINT'));
process.on('uncaughtException', (e) => log('error', 'uncaught', { error: e.message }));
process.on('unhandledRejection', (r) => log('error', 'rejection', { error: String(r) }));

View File

@ -246,81 +246,8 @@ func (s *httpUpstreamService) DoWithTLS(req *http.Request, proxyURL string, acco
return resp, nil
}
// isNodeTLSProxyEnabled 检查 Node.js TLS 代理是否启用
func (s *httpUpstreamService) isNodeTLSProxyEnabled() bool {
if s.cfg == nil {
return false
}
return s.cfg.Gateway.NodeTLSProxy.Enabled
}
// shouldRouteViaNodeProxy 判断请求是否应该走 Node.js TLS 代理
// 仅拦截目标主机在 proxy_hosts 白名单中的 HTTPS 请求,
// 白名单为空时默认只代理 api.anthropic.com。
func (s *httpUpstreamService) shouldRouteViaNodeProxy(req *http.Request) bool {
if req == nil || req.URL == nil || req.URL.Scheme != "https" {
return false
}
reqHost := req.URL.Hostname()
if reqHost == "" {
return false
}
hosts := s.cfg.Gateway.NodeTLSProxy.ProxyHosts
if len(hosts) == 0 {
// 默认只代理 Anthropic
return reqHost == "api.anthropic.com"
}
for _, h := range hosts {
if reqHost == h {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// doViaNodeTLSProxy 通过 Node.js TLS 代理发送请求
// 将 HTTPS 请求改为 HTTP 明文发送到本地 Node.js 代理,
// 由 Node.js 进程使用原生 TLS 栈完成到上游的 HTTPS 连接。
// 原始目标主机通过 X-Forwarded-Host 传递给 Node.js 代理,
// 代理据此动态连接到正确的上游主机。
func (s *httpUpstreamService) doViaNodeTLSProxy(req *http.Request, proxyURL string, accountID int64, accountConcurrency int) (*http.Response, error) {
proxyCfg := s.cfg.Gateway.NodeTLSProxy
listenHost := proxyCfg.ListenHost
if listenHost == "" {
listenHost = "127.0.0.1"
}
listenPort := proxyCfg.ListenPort
if listenPort == 0 {
listenPort = 3456
}
// 克隆请求,避免修改原始 req重试时需要原始 URL
proxyReq := req.Clone(req.Context())
// 安全复制 Body优先用 GetBody 工厂方法
if req.GetBody != nil {
proxyReq.Body, _ = req.GetBody()
} else {
proxyReq.Body = req.Body
}
// 保存原始目标主机,通过自定义头传给 Node.js 代理
originalHost := req.URL.Host
proxyReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", originalHost)
// 重写请求 URLhttps://api.anthropic.com/v1/... → http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/...
proxyReq.URL.Scheme = "http"
proxyReq.URL.Host = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", listenHost, listenPort)
slog.Debug("node_tls_proxy_rewrite",
"account_id", accountID,
"original_host", originalHost,
"rewritten_to", proxyReq.URL.Host,
)
// 通过标准 HTTP 客户端发送(不需要 TLS代理是本地 HTTP
return s.Do(proxyReq, "", accountID, accountConcurrency)
}
// acquireClientWithTLS 获取或创建带 TLS 指纹的客户端
func (s *httpUpstreamService) acquireClientWithTLS(proxyURL string, accountID int64, accountConcurrency int, profile *tlsfingerprint.Profile) (*upstreamClientEntry, error) {

View File

@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
package repository
// ==============================================================
// antigravity — Node.js TLS 代理扩展
//
// 此文件包含 Antigravity fork 新增的 Node.js TLS 代理功能,
// 与 upstream 代码完全隔离,便于 upstream 更新时的合并维护。
//
// 上游文件 http_upstream.go 中的钩子调用点:
// Do() L128-137 — 直接路由到 doViaNodeTLSProxy
// DoWithTLS() L188-193 — 优先走 Node.js 代理
// ==============================================================
import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
)
// isNodeTLSProxyEnabled 检查 Node.js TLS 代理是否启用
func (s *httpUpstreamService) isNodeTLSProxyEnabled() bool {
if s.cfg == nil {
return false
}
return s.cfg.Gateway.NodeTLSProxy.Enabled
}
// shouldRouteViaNodeProxy 判断请求是否应该走 Node.js TLS 代理
// 仅拦截目标主机在 proxy_hosts 白名单中的 HTTPS 请求,
// 白名单为空时默认只代理 api.anthropic.com。
func (s *httpUpstreamService) shouldRouteViaNodeProxy(req *http.Request) bool {
if req == nil || req.URL == nil || req.URL.Scheme != "https" {
return false
}
reqHost := req.URL.Hostname()
if reqHost == "" {
return false
}
hosts := s.cfg.Gateway.NodeTLSProxy.ProxyHosts
if len(hosts) == 0 {
// 默认只代理 Anthropic
return reqHost == "api.anthropic.com"
}
for _, h := range hosts {
if reqHost == h {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// doViaNodeTLSProxy 通过 Node.js TLS 代理发送请求
// 将 HTTPS 请求改为 HTTP 明文发送到本地 Node.js 代理,
// 由 Node.js 进程使用原生 TLS 栈完成到上游的 HTTPS 连接。
// 原始目标主机通过 X-Forwarded-Host 传递给 Node.js 代理,
// 代理据此动态连接到正确的上游主机。
func (s *httpUpstreamService) doViaNodeTLSProxy(req *http.Request, proxyURL string, accountID int64, accountConcurrency int) (*http.Response, error) {
proxyCfg := s.cfg.Gateway.NodeTLSProxy
listenHost := proxyCfg.ListenHost
if listenHost == "" {
listenHost = "127.0.0.1"
}
listenPort := proxyCfg.ListenPort
if listenPort == 0 {
listenPort = 3456
}
// 克隆请求,避免修改原始 req重试时需要原始 URL
proxyReq := req.Clone(req.Context())
// 安全复制 Body优先用 GetBody 工厂方法
if req.GetBody != nil {
proxyReq.Body, _ = req.GetBody()
} else {
proxyReq.Body = req.Body
}
// 保存原始目标主机,通过自定义头传给 Node.js 代理
originalHost := req.URL.Host
proxyReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", originalHost)
// 重写请求 URLhttps://api.anthropic.com/v1/... → http://127.0.0.1:3456/v1/...
proxyReq.URL.Scheme = "http"
proxyReq.URL.Host = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", listenHost, listenPort)
slog.Debug("node_tls_proxy_rewrite",
"account_id", accountID,
"original_host", originalHost,
"rewritten_to", proxyReq.URL.Host,
)
// 通过标准 HTTP 客户端发送(不需要 TLS代理是本地 HTTP
return s.Do(proxyReq, "", accountID, accountConcurrency)
}

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@ -1147,24 +1147,26 @@ func (a *Account) IsAnthropicOAuthOrSetupToken() bool {
}
// IsTLSFingerprintEnabled 检查是否启用 TLS 指纹伪装
// 仅适用于 Anthropic OAuth/SetupToken 类型账号
// 启用后将模拟 Claude Code (Node.js) 客户端的 TLS 握手特征
// 支持 Anthropic OAuth/SetupToken 和 Gemini OAuth 账号(扩展见 account_antigravity.go
// 启用后将通过 node-tls-proxy 路由流量,获得真实 Node.js TLS 握手特征
func (a *Account) IsTLSFingerprintEnabled() bool {
// 仅支持 Anthropic OAuth/SetupToken 账号
if !a.IsAnthropicOAuthOrSetupToken() {
return false
}
if a.Extra == nil {
return false
}
if v, ok := a.Extra["enable_tls_fingerprint"]; ok {
if enabled, ok := v.(bool); ok {
return enabled
// Anthropic OAuth/SetupToken — 原有逻辑
if a.IsAnthropicOAuthOrSetupToken() {
if a.Extra == nil {
return false
}
if v, ok := a.Extra["enable_tls_fingerprint"]; ok {
if enabled, ok := v.(bool); ok {
return enabled
}
}
return false
}
return false
// Gemini OAuth — 扩展(实现在 account_antigravity.go
return geminiTLSFingerprintEnabled(a)
}
// GetUserMsgQueueMode 获取用户消息队列模式
// "serialize" = 串行队列, "throttle" = 软性限速, "" = 未设置(使用全局配置)
func (a *Account) GetUserMsgQueueMode() string {

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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
package service
// ==============================================================
// antigravity — account 扩展
//
// 此文件包含 Antigravity fork 对 Account 的扩展,
// 新增了 Gemini OAuth 账号的 TLS 指纹伪装支持。
//
// 对上游文件 account.go 的改动:
// - IsTLSFingerprintEnabled() 方法改为调用本文件的 geminiTLSFingerprintEnabled()
// (仅需在与上游合并时确保钩子调用点存在)
// ==============================================================
// geminiTLSFingerprintEnabled 检查 Gemini OAuth 账号是否启用 TLS 指纹伪装
// Gemini CLI 也是 Node.js 应用,通过 node-tls-proxy 代理后
// TLS 指纹天然匹配 Gemini CLI无需单独模拟
func geminiTLSFingerprintEnabled(a *Account) bool {
if a.Platform != PlatformGemini || a.Type != AccountTypeOAuth {
return false
}
if a.Extra == nil {
return false
}
if v, ok := a.Extra["enable_tls_fingerprint"]; ok {
if enabled, ok := v.(bool); ok {
return enabled
}
}
return false
}

View File

@ -35,24 +35,7 @@ var defaultFingerprint = Fingerprint{
StainlessRuntimeVersion: "v24.13.0",
}
// ApplyDefaultFingerprintOverrides 用配置覆盖 identity_service 的默认指纹
func ApplyDefaultFingerprintOverrides(cliVersion, pkgVersion, runtimeVersion, os_, arch string) {
if cliVersion != "" {
defaultFingerprint.UserAgent = "claude-cli/" + cliVersion + " (external, cli)"
}
if pkgVersion != "" {
defaultFingerprint.StainlessPackageVersion = pkgVersion
}
if runtimeVersion != "" {
defaultFingerprint.StainlessRuntimeVersion = runtimeVersion
}
if os_ != "" {
defaultFingerprint.StainlessOS = os_
}
if arch != "" {
defaultFingerprint.StainlessArch = arch
}
}
// Fingerprint represents account fingerprint data
type Fingerprint struct {
@ -91,10 +74,7 @@ func NewIdentityService(cache IdentityCache) *IdentityService {
return &IdentityService{cache: cache}
}
// NewIdentityServiceWithSalt 创建带实例盐值的 IdentityService
func NewIdentityServiceWithSalt(cache IdentityCache, salt string) *IdentityService {
return &IdentityService{cache: cache, instanceSalt: salt}
}
// GetOrCreateFingerprint 获取或创建账号的指纹
// 如果缓存存在检测user-agent版本新版本则更新

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@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
package service
// ==============================================================
// antigravity — identity_service 扩展
//
// 此文件包含 Antigravity fork 对 IdentityService 的扩展,
// 新增了实例级隔离盐值和指纹默认值覆盖功能。
//
// 对上游文件 identity_service.go 的最小化改动:
// - defaultFingerprint 版本号更新L29/L31claude-cli 2.1.81 / sdk 0.80.0
// - IdentityService struct 新增 instanceSalt 字段L86
// [以上两处改动仍在原文件中,因为是对已有定义的修改,无法完全抽离]
// ==============================================================
// ApplyDefaultFingerprintOverrides 用配置覆盖 identity_service 的默认指纹
// 允许不同部署实例设置不同的 CLI/SDK 版本号,避免所有实例指纹相同
func ApplyDefaultFingerprintOverrides(cliVersion, pkgVersion, runtimeVersion, os_, arch string) {
if cliVersion != "" {
defaultFingerprint.UserAgent = "claude-cli/" + cliVersion + " (external, cli)"
}
if pkgVersion != "" {
defaultFingerprint.StainlessPackageVersion = pkgVersion
}
if runtimeVersion != "" {
defaultFingerprint.StainlessRuntimeVersion = runtimeVersion
}
if os_ != "" {
defaultFingerprint.StainlessOS = os_
}
if arch != "" {
defaultFingerprint.StainlessArch = arch
}
}
// NewIdentityServiceWithSalt 创建带实例盐值的 IdentityService
// 实例盐值用于 user_id 重写时的 session hash 混淆,
// 使不同 sub2api 实例对相同输入产生不同的 hash 输出,增加隔离性
func NewIdentityServiceWithSalt(cache IdentityCache, salt string) *IdentityService {
return &IdentityService{cache: cache, instanceSalt: salt}
}